Jonathan Edwards presents a view of permission that promotes the same proud boast for which God punished the king of Assyria. The proud boast of the Assyrian king was that God is not in active sovereign control of his actions. In short, Jonathan Edwards is in league with the Assyrian king.
"[T]here is a great difference between God's being
concerned thus, by his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent
subject and agent of it, is sin, (though the event will certainly follow on his
permission,) and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act
of sin; or between his being the orderer of its certain existence, by not
hindering it, under certain circumstances, and his being the proper actor or
author of it, by a positive agency or efficiency. ... So, inasmuch as sin is
not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the
contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and, under
certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence ... men
never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily
sin when he does so ... As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all
future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral, so
it is manifest, that the sovereign Creator and Disposer of the world has
ordered this necessity, by ordering his own conduct, either in designedly
acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world is from God, so
the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and
positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the necessary
consequences of these circumstances must be ordered by him. And God's active
and positive interpositions, after the world was created, and the consequences
of these interpositions, also every instance of his forbearing to interpose,
and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according
to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of any
thing whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing, or
circumstance, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its
existence, must be ordered of God, either by a designing efficiency and
interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. ... God does
decisively, in his providence, order all the volitions of moral agents, either
by positive influence or permission; and it being, allowed, on all hands, that
what God does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or
less, is by some positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in the
affair of a sinful volition" (Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will).